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Abstract
As financial instruments grow in complexity more and more information is ne-
glected by risk optimization practices. This brings down a curtain of opacity on the
origination of risk, that has been one of the main culprits in the 2007-2008 global fi-
nancial crisis. We discuss how the loss of transparency may be quantified in bits, using
information theoretic concepts. We find that i) financial transformations imply large
information losses, ii) portfolios are more information sensitive than individual stocks
only if fundamental analysis is sufficiently informative on the co-movement of assets,
that iii) securitisation, in the relevant range of parameters, yields assets that are less
information sensitive than the original stocks and that iv) when diversification (or secu-
ritisation) is at its best (i.e. when assets are uncorrelated) information losses are max-
imal. We also address the issue of whether pricing schemes can be introduced to deal
with information losses. This is relevant for the transmission of incentives to gather
information on the risk origination side. Within a simple mean variance scheme, we
find that market incentives are not generally sufficient to make information harvesting
sustainable.
1 Introduction
Financial innovations have been seen as a formidable tool to increase the efficiency of the
market, by controlling the risk of financial assets thus easing resource allocation between
investors and the real economy. Yet, several authors [1, 2, 3] have suggested that the increas-
ing complexity of financial products may trigger the emergence of instabilities and systemic
risks. The most commonly believed determinant of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis
is the rise of structured financial products [4]. The formidable complexity of these type of
products effectively brought down a curtain of opacity between the risk originators and the
buyers of the financial products, that hid the true risks of the underlying assets (e.g. mort-
gages, loans, credits) [5, 6]. While the dangers of these instruments had been highlighted
well before the crisis [7], most of the response to the crisis didn’t address the core issue of
∗Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the
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transparency loss implicit in financial transformations, but rather focused on ring fencing the
financial system with various measures [8]. An exception to that, is the proposal [9] to build
an efficient and standardized system, or a common language, through which information on
the origin of risks should be easily available to all market participants. Such a financial bar-
code, which might be attached to any financial product, should contain all the information
that is relevant in order to make realistic estimates about return and risk of the product, from
the risk profiles of the building blocks to the market fundamentals. Yet, it is not clear how
such barcodes should be constructed, which information they should contain and whether
they should be statically or dynamically updated, when new information is available. In par-
ticular, an interesting open question is whether demand for such barcodes may ”naturally”
arise and how barcodes should be priced, since without a barcode price the sellers would
have no incentive for sharing the information.
Apparently, within the prevailing market efficiency hypothesis paradigm, according to
which prices of any stock exchanged in the market reflects faithfully any relevant informa-
tion [10, 11], these barcodes would be worthless. Indeed, for example, the price of Asset
Backed Securities (ABS) were computed only on the basis of default probabilities of the
underlying assets (e.g. mortgages). Even though, in principle, all the documentation about
the underlying assets were available to buyers, the prices of ABS didn’t depend at all on
it, with the consequence that incentives for due diligence in collecting information on the
underlying by issuers were lacking [7, 6]. Yet, market information efficiency resides on the
balance between traders seeking information (fundamental analysis) and traders exploiting
it (technical analysis), as shown by a wealth of results in agent based modelling of finan-
cial markets (see e.g. [12]). The former profit by the fact that the information they gather
grants them an excess return. Here the profits of collecting information accrue to the indi-
vidual trader, while in the case of a structured financial product these are passed over to the
buyer. Accordingly they should be reflected in the price. This simple logic is the basis of
the present paper.
As a first step, we quantify the transparency loss by the amount of bits of information
lost in diversification. Secondly, we address the issue of deriving the optimal barcode, the
one that contains the maximal information on the return of the financial instrument. Then we
compute the price associated to the barcode as the value of the information within a simple
mean variance framework. The information loss and the barcode price are then quantified
within a model system based on Gaussian variables (see [13] for an extension to binary
variables). Within this framework we find that financial transformation implies large infor-
mation losses and that market incentives are not generally sufficient to make information
harvesting sustainable.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the general
setting, information and financial transformation. Then we quantify information losses for
a simple model of Gaussian log-returns and address the issue of information pricing. We
conclude with some general remarks.
2 The general framework
Let’s suppose we have a pool of n assets, e.g. stocks, loans or mortgages, and let ~X =
(X1, . . . , Xn) be the associated vector of (log-)returns. The values ~X are unknown to the
inverstor, so we shall treat them as a vector of random variables, described by a probability
distribution p( ~X). We consider a situation where some side information related to the stock
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Xi, e.g. the income of the borrower of the loan or information on the fundamentals of asset
i, is possibly available. This information is captured by a random variable Yi that, inspired
by Ref. [9], we shall call the barcode associated to asset i. Barcodes allow investors that
bought the asset, to retrieve all information that is relevant to estimate the return of the asset,
in the sense that, given the barcodes ~Y , they can use the conditional distribution p( ~X|~Y )
instead of p( ~X). We shall use the mutual information [14]
I(U, V ) = E
[
log
[
p(u|v)
p(u)
]]
, (1)
to quantify the amount of information that the knowledge of a variable V provides on the
random variable U . In Eq. (1) p(u|v) is the conditional distribution of U given that V = v
and p(u) is the unconditional one1. Hence, I(Xi, Yi) measures in bits the information that
Yi provides on Xi and I( ~X, ~Y ) measures the total amount of information that the barcodes
~Y provide on the returns ~X .
2.1 Financial transformations
We consider financial transformations
~X → F (X), X =
n∑
i=1
Xi, (2)
that entail pooling the n assets into a single portfolioX and applying a transformation F (X).
This generates a new financial asset with log-return F (X). The simplest such transformation
is the portfolio itself that delivers the average log-return
FX¯(X) ≡ X = X/n. (3)
Here, ~X can be the log-returns of individual stocks. In this case, ~Y would encode informa-
tion on fundamentals (e.g. corporate structure of the firm, analysis of the sector they operate
etc) for each stock.
X corresponds to the most basic diversification techniques, which entails investing a
fraction 1/n in each of the n assets, instead of investing in a single asset Xi. The benefit of
diversification is that it reduces risk. For example, for n i.i.d. stocks, the variance V(X) =
V(Xi)/n is reduced by a factor of n, w.r.t. that of individual stocks.
Another class of products we consider are Asset Backed Securities (ABS), the typical
products of structured finance [4], whose return function is based on a prioritized structure
of claims. In these products, the claims over the cash flow of the returns of the underlying
assets Xi are structured in such a way that the ABS yields a positive return when the total
return is larger then a given threshold k. The return of these products is
Fk(X) = θ (X − k) , (4)
where θ(x) = 1 when x ≥ 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise. Different tranches correspond to
different risk profiles that can be obtained with different values of k. The transformation
~X → Fk(X) is an example of securitisation and the advantage of it is that it turns a set
of risky assets Xi into assets with a controlled risk profile. Sufficiently small values of
1For continuous variables p(u|v) and p(u) are probability density functions, see e.g. [14].
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k yield assets that are very safe, i.e. for which Fk(X) = 1 with high probability. As an
example, mortgage backed securities (MBS) [4] are based on a portfolio ~X of mortgages
granted to n households, where Xi = +1 if household i repays the mortgage and Xi = 0 if
i defaults. In this case Yi may encode the occupational status of i, the characteristics of the
neighbourhood of the house bought with the ith mortgage. In this case, i’s default may occur
for idiosyncratic reasons, or for systemic ones (e.g. crisis in the sector of the economy of
the company where Mr. i works or a natural disaster in that region) that may affect different
households in the same way.
Investors can transmit all the information ~Y about the individual assets to the buyers of
the engineered asset F . Yet, some of this information may not be relevant to estimate the
return F (X), i.e. all the information relevant to estimate the return of F may be compressed
in a single variable GF that we call the barcode of F . Clearly, GF (~Y ) has to be a function of
~Y , and, ideally, the barcode GF should be the simplest2 among all possible variables V (~Y )
such that I
(
F (X), V (~Y )
)
= I
(
F (X), ~Y
)
.
A general result can be obtained by invoking the data processing inequality [14]. This
states that in any transformation ~X → F (X) some information may or may not be lost, but
for sure no information can be gained. In terms of the mutual information this reads
I(F (X), GF (~Y )) ≤ I(F (X), ~Y ) ≤ I(X, ~Y ) ≤ I( ~X, ~Y ). (5)
The term on the right end of this chain of inequalities quantifies the total amount of infor-
mation in bits that barcodes ~Y provide on the log-returns ~X . In the typical case of weakly
dependent assets, this is proportional to the number n of assets. By contrast, the second
term from the right is upper bounded by the entropy of the random variable X , which grows
at most as log n. Hence, generally, financial transformations imply information losses. The
choice of the optimal barcode GF (~Y ) can only mitigate further information losses, and at
most saturate the leftmost inequality in Eq. (5).
In the next section we shall turn to the quantitative analysis of a representative case.
3 Barcoding finance in a Gaussian world
Let’s assume that
Xi = µ+ ξi + aξ0 + JYi (6)
Yi = ηi + cη0 (7)
where µ > 0 is a positive constant, and ξi’s and ηi’s are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables
with mean zero and variance one for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. This corresponds to a one-factor
model, where the covariance E[(Xi − µ)(Xj − µ)] = a2 + J2c2 between assets can partly
be explained by the barcode variables (c 6= 0). Notice also that all assets are equivalent, i.e.
the distribution of ( ~X, ~Y ) is invariant under permutations of the assets.
2Here simplest, in information theoretic terms implies the one requiring less bits for its descrip-
tion. For discrete variables this corresponds to the variable V with the smallest entropy H[V ] =
−∑V p(V ) log p(V ). For continuous variables it is necessary to resort to the relative entropy DKL(p||p0) =∫
dV p(V ) log[p(V )/p0(V )], where p0(V ) is a baseline distribution. In the cases we shall discuss in the fol-
lowing the notion of simplicity is rather intuitive, so we shall not discuss these details further.
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The mutual information on individual assets is given by3
I(Xi, Yi) =
1
2
log
(
1 + J2
1 + c2
1 + a2
)
(8)
whereas the total information that barcodes provide on ~X is
I( ~X, ~Y ) =
n− 1
2
log(1 + J2) +
1
2
log
(
1 + J2
1 + nc2
1 + na2
)
. (9)
Since
X = nµ+
n∑
i=1
ξi + naξ0 + JY, Y =
n∑
i=1
Yi, (10)
then the optimal barcode for any F (X) isGF (~Y ) = Y . Indeed, I(F (X), ~Y ) = I(F (X), Y ),
which saturates the leftmost inequality in Eq. (5). The upper bound on the information
content of the barcode is given by
I(X, Y ) =
1
2
log
(
1 + J2
1 + nc2
1 + na2
)
. (11)
We notice that:
1. The barcode’s information on the portfolio log-return X is larger than that on indi-
vidual assets (i.e. I(X, Y ) > I(Xi, Yi)) only if c > a, i.e. if barcodes are sufficiently
informative on the co-movement of assets.
2. I(X, Y ) equals the second term in Eq. (9). Therefore the total loss of information
is upper bounded by the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (9), which increases
linearly with n.
3. The total loss of information I( ~X, ~Y ) − I(X, Y ) is independent of a and c, because
all the available information on the co-movement of stocks is captured by Y .
4. When barcodes are not informative about the correlated variation of assets, i.e. for
c = 0, the information content of the barcode Y vanishes I(X, Y )→ 0 as n→∞.
It is instructive to observe that, when c 6= 0, the barcode Yj provides also information on
the return of asset i4. The case when barcodes are independent (c = 0) may be appropriate
for a portfolio of stocks where Yi accounts only for fundamental analysis of stock i. In
this case, very large portfolios become insensitive to information on the fundamentals of
individual stocks (I(X, Y ) → 0 as n → ∞). This is because X is dominated by the
common component aξ0 on which barcodes Yi provide no information. The behaviour of
I(X, Y ) for the portfolio is summarized in the left panel of Figure 1.
3These results can be derived straightforwardly using textbook formulas (see e.g. [14]).
4A trite calculation shows that
I(Xi, Yj) = −1
2
log
{
1− J
2c2
(1 + c2)[1 + a2 + J2(1 + c2)]
}
. (12)
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The mutual information can be computed also for the ABS as follows. In a model of
gaussian log-returns and information, the threshold parameter k of a tranche Fk can be
related to the default probability
pkd = p(X < nµ+ k) = H
(
k√
V(X)
)
where H(z) =
∫ z
−∞
dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2 is the cumulative normal distribution function. When infor-
mation Y is revealed, this default probability changes into
pkd(Y ) = p(X ≤ nµ+ k|Y ) = H
(
k − JY√
V(X|Y )
)
using this expression for pkd(Y ) and using Eq. (1),
I(Fk, Y ) = E
[
pkd(Y ) log
pkd(Y )
pkd
+ (1− pkd(Y )) log
1− pkd(Y )
1− pkd
]
, (13)
where the expectation is taken on the distribution of Y . In the right panel of Figure 1 we plot
the behaviour of the mutual information for the ABS. I(Fk, X) follows the same qualitative
behaviour of I(X, Y ) although its value is considerably smaller (more than tenfold in the
example of Figure 1). In addition, I(Fk, Y ) decreases for safer and safer assets (i.e. as pd
decreases), showing that most senior tranches of ABS tend to be remarkably information
insensitive.
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FIGURE 1. Mutual information I(X,Y ) and I(Fk, Y ) of barcodes for portfolio (left) and ABS (right) gener-
ated from Gaussian underlying assets (J = 0.5), as a function of n.
3.1 The cost of information: pricing barcodes
Let us now address the issue of quantifying the value of the information conveyed by the
barcodes. The key question we want to address is whether the demand for barcodes can en-
dogenously arise in a market. This is possible if barcodes can be priced in such a way that the
value of the barcode of a financial instrument provides enough incentives for gathering in-
formation on the individual assets. We address this question within a mean-variance pricing
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scheme. Hence the setting we consider is that of a portfolio manager that gathers informa-
tion on n assets, and sells n shares of the resulting portfolio, charging an additional amount
related to the price of the information contained in the portfolio’s barcode. Investors exploit
their available information about assets payoffs to price the financial product Z = FZ(X).
When they have access to the barcode, they use the probability p(Z|Y ) to asses future per-
formances of the assets, otherwise they use p(Z). In a mean variance framework, the price of
X depends on the first two moments of Z. When no barcode is provided, the mean variance
price reads:
pZ = E[Z]− αV[Z], (14)
where α > 0 is the relative risk aversion coefficient. A micro-foundation of the previous
formula is discussed in appendix A. As shown there, conditionally on knowing the barcode’s
value y, the price is:
pZ|Y=y = E[Z|Y = y]− αV[Z|Y = y]. (15)
Depending on the realized information y, the price difference between having or not the
barcode can be positive or negative. The price of the barcode should be computed before
the realized value of Y is known, therefore it is given by
δpZ := E[pZ|Y ]− pZ = α {V(Z)− E [V(Z|Y )]} = αV (E[Z|Y ]) , (16)
where V(Z|Y ) is the variance of Z on the distribution p(Z|Y ) and E[Z|Y ] is the expected
value of Z conditional on the value Y . Eq. (16) takes the expected value over Y of V(Z|Y )
and the variance of E[Z|Y ] over the distribution of Y . This result reflects the fact that the
knowledge of the distribution of Y does not change the unconditional expected log-return
of the asset, but produces a reduction in variance which is equal to the variance of the
conditional expected return.
To assess the presence of incentives for barcodes, we shall compare expected revenues
from the barcode with the cost of gathering information, which is given by the cost of the
barcodes of the original assets.
When log-returns are given by Eq. (6), the cost of gathering information for a single
asset is
δpXi = αJ
2(1 + c2). (17)
The additional log-return that the optimal barcode Y =
∑
i ηi + ncη0 yields is
δpX = αJ
2(1/n+ c2). (18)
Considering this as the price of the barcode that the portfolio manager can charge when
selling X , together with the barcode, we find that the budget’s balance for the portfolio
manager for selling n shares of X , is
nδpX −
n∑
i=1
δpXi = −α(n− 1)J2 (19)
which is negative. In words, this pricing mechanism does not provide incentives to gather
information on individual assets. Interestingly, when barcodes provide information on the
co-movement of the assets (c > 0), the value of information on the whole portfolio, instead,
is larger than the sum of the cost of information on individual assets, i.e.
δpX −
n∑
i=1
δpXi = αn(n− 1)J2c2. (20)
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This is a consequence of the non-linearity of the pricing mechanism and of the fact that,
for c > 0 the barcode Yi of asset i provides information also on other asset log-returns Xj .
Indeed, there is a minimal share size, above which the barcode associated to the log-return
X/m provides enough incentives to gather information on individual assets in the sense that
mδpX/m − nδpXi ≥ 0. A simple calculation shows that
m ≤ 1 + J
2(1 + nc2)
1 + J2(1 + c2)
. (21)
The same calculation can be extended to ABS in a straightforward manner, yet the results
depends on the way in which the portfolio X is divided into tranches
X =
∑
k
fkFk(X) (22)
for some positive constants fk. Then we show in appendix B that
δpX >
∑
k
δpfkFk(X). (23)
This, together with the fact that for c = 0 Eq. (20) implies that δpX =
∑
i δpXi , shows that if
barcodes do not provide information on correlated defaults, securitisation cannot provide in-
centives to gather information on individual assets (within the present mean variance frame-
work). This suggests that, unless information on correlated defaults of individual assets is
accounted for, securitisation decreases the value of information contained in barcodes.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we exploit information theoretic concepts to investigate the lack of transparency
associated with financial transformations. We discuss a setting where side information about
the returns of assets is modelled with an associated random variable, and the information
content is quantified using the mutual information. In this setting, we show that every finan-
cial transformation implies information losses. In a model of Gaussian log-returns, we find
that when fundamental analysis on individual assets is not informative on the co-movement
of assets, the information is totally lost in the limit of very large portfolios. In addition,
we show that, within a mean variance framework, the value of information also decreases,
which suggests that incentives to gather information on individual assets cannot be transmit-
ted across financial transformation. This puts serious doubts of whether market incentives
alone are enough to make the introduction of a system of barcodes, as advocated in Ref. [9]
sustainable.
These result generalise to a model of assets with binary returns, which is more appropri-
ate for credit derivatives (see Ref. [13]). The aim of the present paper is that of suggesting
ways forward to quantify transparency losses in finance and to raise few key issues. As
such, it might be a benchmark for more complex and realistic theoretical models, or for
more appropriate schemes to value information in order to overcome these issues.
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A Mean variance pricing
In order to do this, we adopt a standard mean-variance framework5. Consider a representa-
tive agent with an initial wealth W , that is facing the decision of buying W units of wealth
of an asset with return Z. If her utility function is given by U(·), the certainty equivalent
w of this investment is defined as that value for which the investor is indifferent between
investing in the asset or receiving w units of wealth, i.e.
U(W + w) = E [U(W + WZ)] , (24)
where E[. . .] stands for the expectation on the random variable Z. We take w as a measure
of the value of the investment that incorporates the risk premium. Assuming that  1 and
w  W , we can expand both sides and derive, to leading order, the price of Z as the value
per unit of investment.
pZ ≡ w
αW
' E[Z]− αV(Z), α = −U”(W )W
2U ′(W )
. (25)
If we further assume investors with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), then α is a
constant, that we assume can be estimated from market data.
B Pricing ABS
From Eq. (22)
E[X|Y ] =
∑
k
fkE[Fk(X)|Y ] (26)
We assume that X ≥ 0 and that fk > 0. Hence
δpX = αV(E[X|Y ])
=
∑
k
f 2kαV(E[Fk(X)|Y ]) +∑
k 6=k′
αfkfk′E [(E[Fk(X)|Y ]− E[Fk(X)]) (E[Fk′(X)|Y ]− E[Fk′(X)])]
>
∑
k
δpfkFk(X)
where the last equation results from the fact that the covariance of E[Fk(X)|Y ] is positive.
5We consider here a setting of incomplete markets, which is appropriate specially for credit markets.
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